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Defining “Sexual Abuse of a Minor” in 
Immigration Law: Finding a Place for Uniformity, 
Fairness, and Feminism 
Kate Barth 
INTRODUCTION 
In June 2001, twenty-year-old Juan Elias Estrada-Espinoza, a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States, met Sonia Arredondo, who was 
either fifteen or sixteen at the time.1 The two started a relationship, lived 
together for some time with Estrada-Espinoza’s parents before moving to 
their own residence, and eventually raised a child together.2 The 
relationship was sanctioned by both sets of parents.3 However, in 2004 the 
California District Attorney filed statutory rape charges against Estrada-
Espinoza and he was convicted on four counts under the California Penal 
Code.4 Soon after his conviction for statutory rape, the Department of 
Homeland Security commenced deportation proceedings, and Estrada-
Espinoza was found removable as an “aggravated felon” under 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), also known as § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA).5 
The term “aggravated felony” is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) 
(INA § 101(a)(43)(A)) as “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor.” 
However, as “sexual abuse of a minor” is not explicitly defined in the INA, 
both the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which heard Estrada-
Espinoza’s appeal, and the initial panel of the Ninth Circuit, which denied 
Estrada-Espinoza’s petition for review, looked to the BIA’s decision in In 
re Rodriguez-Rodriguez6 for a definition.7 Rodriguez-Rodriguez tied the 
term “sexual abuse of a minor” to the definition given in 18 U.S.C. § 
3509(a)(8), which is a provision that construes “sexual abuse” in the context 
of the rights of child witnesses.8 Under this expansive definition, the BIA 
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and the initial Ninth Circuit panel concluded that Estrada-Espinoza’s state 
conviction for statutory rape constituted “sexual abuse of a minor.”9 
However, when the case was ordered to be reheard en banc, the Ninth 
Circuit decided that “sexual abuse of a minor” should be more properly tied 
to the definition given in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2242–2246, which is a set of 
provisions in substantive federal criminal law.10 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent reversal highlights a circuit split over the 
proper definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” for the purposes of 
determining an “aggravated felony” in the INA. Although the Ninth Circuit 
now determines whether state convictions for statutory rape constitute 
“sexual abuse of a minor” by comparing the state conviction to the 
definition given in §§ 2242–2246, the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh 
Circuits still give deference to the BIA’s determination that § 3509(a)(8) is 
the proper definition.11 The Fifth Circuit also favors the broader scope of 
the § 3509(a)(8) definition, but in the slightly different context of sentence 
enhancement for aggravated felons that illegally reenter.12 Adding to the 
confusion, the First Circuit refuses to tie “sexual abuse of a minor” to a 
federal definition and has instead indicated that any state conviction for 
statutory rape constitutes an aggravated felony as intended by the INA.13 
The differences between these possible definitions are striking. Section 
3509(a)(8), a federal provision construing the rights of child witnesses, 
reads: 
[T]he term “sexual abuse” includes the employment, use, 
persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to 
engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexually explicit 
conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of 
sexual exploitation of children, or incest with children.14 
This definition covers all children—persons up to eighteen years of 
age—and includes offenses commonly classified as indecent exposure. It 
does not include an age-span gap provision—permitting, for example, a 
person to engage in sexual conduct with a minor less than four years 
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younger than him or her. A court referring to this provision would 
presumably find that a noncitizen15 convicted under a state statute that 
criminalizes consensual sex between an eighteen-year-old and a seventeen-
year-old was deportable as an aggravated felon. Likewise, this definition 
would allow the deportation of a person convicted under a state statute for 
indecent exposure. 
Sections 2242–2246, provisions in substantive federal criminal law, 
would allow deportation for a much narrower range of persons convicted 
under state law. The provisions read in part: 
§ 2243 Sexual Abuse of a Minor or Ward. (a) Of a Minor. 
Whoever . . . knowingly engages in a sexual act with another 
person who (1) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained 
the age of 16 years; and (2) is at least four years younger than the 
person so engaging; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this 
title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. 
§ 2244 Abusive Sexual Contact. . . . (c) Offenses Involving 
Young Children. If the sexual contact that violates this section . . . 
is with an individual who has not attained the age of 12 years, the 
maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for the 
offense shall be twice that otherwise provided in this section.16 
While definitively prohibiting sexual relations with anyone under twelve-
years-old, these provisions create a separate age-span category for children 
from twelve to sixteen years of age. When considered in light of the INA, 
persons who are less than four years older than the child cannot be fined or 
imprisoned—or deported. Additionally, the provision includes no penalty 
for consensual sexual relations with children sixteen and older. 
Furthermore, § 2243 requires a sexual act, which has been defined in § 2246 
to mean physical contact.17 Thus, a court referring to this provision could 
not deport a noncitizen who was convicted solely of indecent exposure. An 
eighteen-year-old convicted of statutory rape based on his relationship with 
a fifteen-year-old would also be safe from deportation, as would a fifty-
year-old who had consensual sex with a sixteen-year-old. 
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Finally, defining an aggravated felony to include any state conviction for 
statutory rape, as the First Circuit does, perhaps allows the broadest range 
of convicted noncitizens to be deported. A potential two-step process is 
collapsed into one, and a noncitizen’s state conviction leads to automatic 
eligibility for deportation. 
Because a noncitizen who is convicted of “sexual abuse of a minor” is 
deportable as a person who has committed an aggravated felony, the 
breadth of the definition chosen by the courts has far-reaching consequences 
on the lives of noncitizens convicted of sex crimes. The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that deportation is “a drastic measure and at times the 
equivalent of banishment or exile.”18 As immigration law trends toward 
reducing the due process safeguards for noncitizens convicted of crimes, it 
is ever more crucial to choose the definition that best corresponds to our 
nation’s ideal immigration policy.19 While policymakers may differ on the 
contours of that ideal policy, ensuring that the law is applied uniformly 
throughout the states and that the law is fair to those most impacted stand as 
crucial concerns of any immigration regime. 
Moreover, when dealing with laws concerning sexual abuse of minors, it 
remains imperative to keep in mind what society might hope to achieve 
through its statutory rape laws: safeguarding a child’s chastity, preventing 
predatory sexual behavior, or preserving a youth’s sexual autonomy. 
Although the term “sexual abuse of a minor” encompasses a broad range of 
offenses, this article focuses on statutory rape because the two possible 
definitions that courts wrestle with differ mainly in their approach to 
statutory rape;20 both § 3509(a)(8) and §§ 2242–2246 would find violent or 
nonconsensual sexual assault offenders deportable. 
This article delves into the rich feminist discourse around the history, 
aims, advantages, and failings of various statutory rape regimes in order to 
analyze the objectives of laws that regulate the sexual activity of children. 
Although feminist theory may not appear to be a natural tool to dissect 
immigration policy, § 101(a)(43)(A) offers a unique juncture between 
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immigration policy and gender theory; we must not forget that in defining 
the scope of “sexual abuse of a minor” the courts will, in part, be crafting 
laws that shape the sexual lives of minors—a topic more extensively dealt 
with by feminist scholars than immigration policymakers.21 Thus, while 
rational opinions vary on the goals of immigration and statutory rape laws, 
this article asserts that the most relevant definition for “sexual abuse of a 
minor” is one that considers issues of fairness, uniform application of law, 
and feminist theories on the proper goals of statutory rape laws. 
Ultimately, this article suggests that, rather than looking to § 3509(a)(8) 
or fully relying on a state conviction, courts should compare the state statute 
of conviction with the definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” encoded in 
substantive federal criminal law at §§ 2242–2246. Looking at the varied 
decisions coming out of the BIA and the First, Second, Third, Fifth, 
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits, Part I of this article will analyze the 
current judicial split and the implications of the different proffered 
definitions. Part II will explore the legislative history behind the insertion of 
“sexual abuse of a minor” into the INA with the aim of deciphering how 
Congress intended the courts to interpret the term. Shifting gears to focus on 
certain factors that courts should take into account when choosing a 
definition, Part III will debate what role questions of unity, fairness, and 
feminist theory ought to play in defining “sexual abuse of a minor.” Finally, 
Part IV will argue that §§ 2242–2246 are the best definitions to adopt 
because §§ 2242–2246 are construed in favor of the noncitizen, resulting in 
a more uniform application of the law, and aligns more closely with 
feminist perceptions of what a statutory rape law should accomplish. 
I. CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE DEFINITION OF “SEXUAL ABUSE OF A 
MINOR”22 
In Rodriguez-Rodriguez, the BIA published an opinion meant to serve as 
a guide for courts grappling with the issue of how to interpret “sexual abuse 
of a minor” in § 101(a)(43)(A).23 The opinion indicated that courts should 
862 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
look to § 3509(a)(8), a provision construing “sexual abuse” in the context of 
the rights of child witnesses.24 The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, 
while not weighing in on whether § 3509(a)(8) is the best possible 
definition, have agreed to defer to the BIA’s opinion and have adopted the § 
3509(a)(8) definition of sexual abuse.25 The Fifth Circuit has also indicated 
that it adheres to the broad reading of the term “sexual abuse of a minor.”26 
The Ninth Circuit, however, has explicitly rejected the § 3509(a)(8) 
definition, and has decided instead to adopt the “sexual abuse of a minor” 
definition as given by §§ 2242–2246, which are a set of provisions in 
federal substantive criminal law.27 Choosing not to look to federal law at all, 
the First Circuit has indicated that it considers all state convictions for 
statutory rape to constitute aggravated felonies as they automatically fall 
within the purview of the § 1101(a)(43)(A) definition of “rape.”28 
A. The BIA Defines “Sexual Abuse of a Minor” 
In Rodriguez-Rodriguez, the noncitizen defendant was convicted of 
indecency with a child by exposure under § 21.11(a)(2) of the Texas Penal 
Code.29 He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, and five years after 
his initial conviction, charged with removability as an aggravated felon 
because he had been convicted of “sexual abuse of a minor.”30 A deeply 
divided Board explicitly published an opinion that was meant to analyze 
and determine the proper definition of “sexual abuse of minor” in § 
101(a)(43)(A) of the INA. 
The BIA began its analysis by looking to the congressional decision “to 
provide a comprehensive statutory scheme to cover crimes against 
children.”31 This congressional decision broadened the category of 
“aggravated felony” in the INA to include “rape and sexual abuse of a 
minor” through the 1996 passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).32 This legislative history persuaded 
the BIA to choose a definition that reflected this broad intent. The BIA 
concluded that they would tie the term to a federal definition because 
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removal proceedings are federal law, even though Congress did not 
specifically cross-reference “sexual abuse of a minor” with a federal 
provision.33 Left with the two possible federal definitions of “sexual abuse,” 
the BIA found that “18 U.S.C. § 3509(a) better captures [the] broad 
spectrum of sexually abusive behavior. The definition set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2242, 2243, and 2246 are, in our view, too restrictive to encompass the 
numerous state crimes that can be viewed as sexual abuse.”34 
The BIA also justified its choice of definition by pointing out that § 
3509(a)(8) comports with the generally understood meaning of “sexual 
abuse of a minor.” Looking to the definition of “sexual abuse” as commonly 
defined in Black’s Law Dictionary,35 the BIA noted that “the common 
usage of the term includes a broad range of maltreatment of a sexual nature, 
and it does not indicate that contact is a limiting factor.”36 
Board Member Guendelsberger, however, argued forcibly against § 
3509(a)(8) as the correct definition.37 He pointed out that § 3509(a)(8) is a 
social welfare provision and was never intended to define a criminal 
offense.38 Moreover, while Guendelsberger agreed with the majority’s 
finding that Congress included the term “sexual abuse of a minor” to 
broaden the category of aggravated felonies, he noted that both § 3509(a)(8) 
and §§ 2242–2246 expand upon this category.39 Guendelsberger also opined 
that Congress was aware that federal criminal law and many state laws do 
not include indecent exposure offenses under “sexual abuse of a minor.” 
Therefore, “had Congress intended to include indecent exposure and other 
noncontact offenses under the term ‘sexual abuse of a minor,’ it would have 
explicitly so stated in the terms of the Act.”40 Finally, Guendelsberger 
observed that, given the uncertainty inherent in statutory interpretation, the 
majority “completely ignores the principle that ambiguities in statutory 
interpretation must be resolved through reasonable interpretations in favor 
of the alien.”41 For all of these reasons, Guendelsberger concluded that §§ 
2242–2246 would be the preferred definition. 
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B. The Second, Third, Seventh, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits Adopt § 
3509(a)(8) 
The Second, Third, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have decided to defer 
to the BIA’s § 3509(a)(8) definition since, under the well-established 
Chevron rule,42 when Congress’s intent is uncertain and the statutory 
language is unclear, reviewing courts should defer to the interpretation of 
the agency that oversees the statute.43 The Second Circuit noted that “[t]he 
Supreme Court has held ‘that the BIA should be accorded Chevron 
deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms concrete meaning through a 
process of case-by-case adjudication.’”44 Thus, because the language of § 
101(a)(43)(A) “yields no clear evidence of congressional intent as to the 
scope of the phrase,”45 the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits 
found deference to Rodriguez-Rodriguez appropriate.46 
Although choosing to defer to the BIA-endorsed § 3509(a)(8) 
definition,47 the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits have by and large 
withheld judgment as to whether they believe § 3509(a)(8) is the best 
possible definition. Indeed, although the Third Circuit repeatedly defined 
“sexual abuse of a minor” based on § 3509(a)(8), this circuit has not yet 
produced an opinion analyzing the merits of such a definition. In fact, in 
Stubbs v. Attorney Gen., the Third Circuit, though using § 3509(a)(8) as the 
touchstone for its analysis, specifically refused to pass judgment on the BIA 
interpretation.48 
However, in deciding Mugalli v. Ashcroft, the Second Circuit indicated 
that it believed § 3509(a)(8) to be an “appropriate” definition: 
[N]ot simply because it appears somewhere in the United States 
Code, but because it is consonant with the generally understood 
broad meaning of the term “sexual abuse” as reflected in Black’s. . 
. . It is also supported by the BIA’s reading of Congressional intent 
to ‘provide . . . a comprehensive scheme to cover crimes against 
children.’49 
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The Mugalli court applauded the BIA for providing uniformity by using a 
federal definition that applies nationwide, while simultaneously recognizing 
that achieving true uniformity would probably thwart the congressional 
intent to broaden the category of aggravated felony.50 The Mugalli court 
noted that to ensure strict uniformity “the age of consent for purposes of 
deciding whether the conviction for the crime constitutes ‘sexual abuse of a 
minor’ would have to be the lowest age provided by the law of any state,” 
thus resulting in an undesired “lowest common denominator” effect.51 
While uniform application of federal law is important, the Second Circuit 
decided that Congress acknowledged that criminal law varied by region “by 
providing that the term ‘aggravated felony’ ‘applies to an offense . . . 
whether in violation of Federal or State law’” and thus understood that 
there would be some disunity in the application of this provision.52 
The Seventh Circuit has also concluded that “the BIA’s resort to section 
3509(a)(8) and its broad definition of sexual abuse is reasonable” and has 
shown some preference for this definition over §§ 2242–2243, though that 
court has refrained from an in-depth analysis of the merits of the two 
definitions.53 In deciding Lara-Ruiz v. INS, a case involving the physical 
molestation of a four-year-old, the court rejected the petitioner’s argument 
that his conviction did not constitute “sexual abuse of a minor” because that 
term should be defined only by § 2243, which requires the minor to be 
between the ages of twelve and sixteen.54 Although the BIA had actually 
concluded that the petitioner’s crime constituted sexual abuse even when 
analyzed under §§ 2242–2246, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion indicated that 
it favored an even wider definition of the term.55 In later cases, the Seventh 
Circuit specifically reaffirmed this preference for § 3509(a)(8) over §§ 
2242–2243, emphasizing what they saw as the broad congressional intent 
behind “sexual abuse of a minor.”56 
While the Fifth Circuit has not explicitly deferred to the BIA 
interpretation of “sexual abuse of a minor,” it has decided that the term has 
an expansive meaning which covers indecent exposure offenses.57 In United 
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States v. Zavala-Sustaita,58 the court considered the meaning of “sexual 
abuse of a minor” in the context of the aggravated felony sentencing 
enhancement in the Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2.59 The facts of the case 
revolved around a noncitizen convicted under Texas Penal Code § 
21.11(a)(2) for masturbating in front of two young children.60 Because the 
Sentencing Guidelines indicated that the term “aggravated felony” was to 
be defined by reference to § 101(a)(43)(A), the Fifth Circuit took the 
opportunity to discuss what they saw as the scope of “sexual abuse of a 
minor.” 
In attempting to define the ordinary and common meaning of the phrase, 
the Fifth Circuit looked to the American Heritage Dictionary entries for 
“sexual” and “abuse” and determined that these definitions did not preclude 
indecent exposure.61 Moreover, the court concluded that “[a] distinction that 
treats a stranger’s brief groping of a child in a public shower as qualitatively 
more serious than the conduct of an adult who verbally forces a child to 
watch him repeatedly engage in sex acts is unjustifiable.”62 Discussing 
congressional intent, the Fifth Circuit decided that, in not tying “sexual 
abuse of a minor” to a federal provision or requiring a minimum sentence 
length, Congress explicitly did not limit its meaning of the phrase.63 
Although not expressly adopting the § 3509(a)(8) definition, the Fifth 
Circuit discarded § 2243 as a possible definition. It concluded that Congress 
might have had good reason to look outside of § 2243 for a definition since 
§ 2243 “creates a substantive federal offense, while [§ 101(a)(43)(A)] 
attaches consequences, in the immigration context, to offenses already 
committed.”64 The court observed that under § 3509(a)(8) a noncitizen’s 
offense would be considered an aggravated felony,65 and the “BIA 
addressed the exact same issue” in Rodriguez-Rodriguez, holding that 
“sexual abuse of a minor” encompasses indecent exposure.66 Thus, while 
the Fifth Circuit never officially deferred to the BIA’s definition, nor 
adopted § 3509(a)(8) on its own merits, the Zavala-Sustaita opinion 
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indicated that the Court considered “sexual abuse of a minor” to be defined 
in roughly the same terms as § 3509(a)(8). 
C. The Ninth Circuit Defines “Sexual Abuse of a Minor” 
Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey presented the Ninth Circuit with its second 
pass at the § 101(a)(43)(A) definition.67 The year before Estrada-Espinoza 
made its way to the circuit court, the Ninth Circuit decided Afridi v. 
Gonzales, a case which required the court to define “sexual abuse of a 
minor” in the context of a thirty-something-year-old man who had sexual 
intercourse with a seventeen-year-old prostitute.68 In Afridi, the Ninth 
Circuit deferred to the Rodriguez-Rodriguez § 3509(a)(8) definition;69 thus, 
when Estrada-Espinoza first presented itself to the Ninth Circuit in 2007, 
the court held that Afridi was the binding precedent and denied the petition 
for review.70 However, just a year later, the court decided to accept the 
Estrada-Espinoza petition for review, declared §§ 2242–2246 to be the 
correct definition,71 and overturned Afridi.72 
The opinion justifying the swap in definitions led its readers through a 
reclassification of the aggravated felonies listed in INA § 101(a)(43). The 
Ninth Circuit explained that the INA actually defined two kinds of 
aggravated felonies. The first kind of aggravated felonies “refer to a broad 
category of offenses, using a potentially ambiguous phrasing, [and 
references] other statutory provisions for clarification.”73 The second kind 
of aggravated felonies are “those that refer to a specific crime which is 
already clearly defined in criminal law [and] have no need for a cross-
reference.”74 Because “sexual abuse of a minor” refers to the specific 
federal crime enumerated in §§ 2242–2246, it falls into the latter category.75 
The court thus reasoned that  
[If] Congress had intended the aggravated felony “sexual abuse 
of a minor” to be defined differently than the criminal offense 
“sexual abuse of a minor” it could have provided a definition, 
cross-referenced a different federal code provision, or even 
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specified that the definition was not limited to the criminal 
definition.76  
Since Congress did not give any particular indication as to what the 
definition should be, “the logical inference is that Congress intended ‘sexual 
abuse of a minor’ to carry its standard criminal definition, on par with 
‘murder’ or ‘rape.’”77 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit decided that courts 
should not look to § 3509(a)(8)—the federal provision which construes the 
rights of child witnesses—but rather to §§ 2242–2246, which encodes the 
substantive federal crime. 
The Estrada-Espinoza Court also dealt with the issue of whether 
deference was due to the BIA’s choice of definition. While recognizing that, 
under Chevron, deference was due to the BIA’s published decisions that 
dealt with interpretation of the INA, the Court held that such deference was 
inappropriate in the instant matter because “the BIA did not construe the 
statute and provide a uniform definition in the decision. Rather it developed 
an advisory guideline for future case-by-case interpretation.”78 According to 
the Supreme Court, such interpretation lacks the force of law and does not 
enjoy Chevron deference.79 Although the Ninth Circuit admitted that 
Rodriguez-Rodriguez does have “the force of decisional law,” it concluded 
that the opinion still served as a “guide” for defining “sexual abuse of a 
minor” because it “suffers from the same imprecision that internal agency 
guidelines possess.”80 Drawing from a Seventh Circuit opinion, the Ninth 
Circuit agreed that “when the BIA hasn’t done anything to particularize the 
meaning of a term, giving Chevron deference to its determination of that 
meaning has no practical significance.”81 
In addition to believing §§ 2242–2246 are the correct definition merely 
because they provide the federal criminal offense and not a federal law 
defining sexual abuse in another context, the Ninth Circuit argued that §§ 
2242–2246 were the best substantive definitions. Primarily, the Court 
contended that the younger age of sexual consent given in § 2243 comports 
well with the commonly understood meaning of “sexual abuse of a 
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minor.”82 The court came to this conclusion after surveying state statutes 
and the Model Penal Code’s provision on statutory rape, and finding that 
the majority of state statutes and the Model Penal Code set the age of sexual 
consent at sixteen, just like § 2243.83 The court also pointed to prior case 
law which determined that consensual underage sex is not necessarily 
harmful to older adolescents.84 
D. The First Circuit Considers “Sexual Abuse of a Minor” 
Although the First Circuit has yet to produce an opinion that fully 
grapples with defining “sexual abuse of a minor,” it has decided two cases 
which required it to touch upon the issue.85 In 2001, when determining 
whether a stepfather’s conviction for touching his 13-year-old step-
daughter’s chest and groin area constituted “sexual abuse of a minor,”86 the 
First Circuit concluded that “unlawful sexual contact with a minor 
approximating the federal definition [in §§ 2242–2246] is presumptively 
within the amended INA’s scope.”87 While the opinion seemed to lean 
toward applying the definition in §§ 2242–2246, the court recognized that 
the broader § 3509(a)(8) definition was also available; although, citing 
Guendelsberger’s dissent in Rodriguez-Rodriguez, it expressed concerns 
over its relevance.88 However, by assuming that the noncitizen’s conduct 
would be a deportable offense under either definition, the First Circuit did 
not need to strongly justify its penchant for §§ 2242–2246 and left an open 
question as to what definition applies.89 
Five years later, in 2006, the First Circuit tackled the issue again. In Silva 
v. Gonzales, the resident noncitizen pleaded guilty under Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ch. 265, § 23 to a charge of statutory rape involving a fourteen-year-old 
girl; the offender was probably in his early twenties at the time.90 The First 
Circuit pointed out that  
[B]y its plain terms, the INA provides that ‘rape’ is an 
aggravated felony. . . . Here the statute of conviction, Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ch. 265 §23, specifically terms the crime of conviction 
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‘[r]ape.’ Under the explicit language of the INA, all rape—
including statutory rape—comes within the aggravated felony 
taxonomy.91  
According to this logic, any state conviction that could be classified as 
some form of rape automatically qualifies as an aggravated felony under the 
INA. Interestingly, such reasoning would conclude that a statutory rapist 
qualifies as an aggravated felon under the “rape” prong of § 101(a)(42)(A) 
and not under the “sexual abuse of a minor” prong. Thus, this opinion 
actually sidesteps the difficult question of defining “sexual abuse of a 
minor.” 
In short, the First Circuit seems to be advocating an automatic 
deportation process for noncitizens convicted under state laws of statutory 
rape. Instead of determining whether the state law conviction qualifies as 
“sexual abuse of a minor,” the First Circuit would automatically shunt 
statutory rapists into the category of “rape” and place them on the fast track 
to deportation. The advantage of such a process is the clear and efficient 
standard for dealing with noncitizen statutory rapists. The downside is the 
resulting fragmentation of federal law, should each noncitizen’s removal 
process be tied to his or her state’s statutory rape laws. It is also probable 
that tying state provisions to automatic removal would lead to vastly 
overinclusive results; for example, a state could have a disjunctive statute 
which covers child sexual abuse, statutory rape, and nonsexual child 
abuse.92 A noncitizen convicted under such a statute for his nonsexual child 
abuse might be automatically pushed into deportation proceedings under the 
“rape” category. Thus, simplicity proves to be both the benefit and 
weakness of this approach. 
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
One reason that courts have had such a difficult time settling on a 
definition for “sexual abuse of a minor” is that Congress gave very little 
direction as to the intended scope of the phrase when it passed IIRIRA—the 
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act that inserted “sexual abuse of a minor” into the INA. There was no 
actual discussion about how the phrase should be defined; Congress 
seemingly inserted the language into the INA without conscious 
acknowledgment that the ambiguous provision would produce divisive 
results. In looking to Congress for guidance in this statutory interpretation, 
we look not to any stated intent, but rather to the subtext in the passage of 
the bill, the placement of the words, and the existence of related provisions. 
On the one hand, the Rodriguez-Rodriguez court’s contention that the 
purpose of the IIRIRA was to broaden the grounds for deportability seems 
accurate when looking at the context of the overall act.93 The IIRIRA is not 
friendly to convicted noncitizens:94 it prohibits a deported aggravated felon 
from ever returning to the United States,95 removes judicial discretion in 
cases where deportation would automatically follow conviction,96 requires 
that all convicted noncitizens be detained while awaiting deportation,97 
provides for expedited removal of aggravated felons,98 eliminates a waiver 
of deportation previously available to convicted noncitizens,99 greatly 
reduces opportunities for appeals,100 and applies the aggravated felony 
provision retroactively.101 When viewed against this sprawling background 
of ever-stricter measures, it seems likely that Congress intended that the 
phrase “sexual abuse of a minor” be viewed expansively. 
On the other hand, word placement and the existence of related 
provisions suggest that Congress did not intend for the phrase to be read as 
broadly as the Rodriguez-Rodriguez court interpreted it. As noted by BIA 
dissenter Guendelsberger, the placement of “sexual abuse of a minor” in the 
same provision of “murder” and “rape” and at the head of a litany of 
possible aggravated felonies may have indicated that Congress intended the 
term to cover only the most egregious of offenses.102 Moreover, other 
sexual offenses relating to children, such as pornography, are later 
enumerated as aggravated felonies by § 101(a)(43)(I), making it more 
probable that Congress only intended “sexual abuse of a minor” to cover 
contact offenses, thus excluding indecent exposure from the definition.103 
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The language of sections ultimately discarded also point to a narrower 
construction of the term. When the IIRIRA was discussed in the House, 
House members proposed the addition of a section entitled “Crimes of 
Sexual Violence” which stated that any noncitizen convicted of “aggravated 
sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual contact or other crime of 
sexual violence is deportable.”104 This provision was not ultimately 
included in the IIRIRA because House members deferred to the Senate 
version of the bill, possibly because they recognized the Senate version 
already covered such serious offenses. As argued by Guendelsberger, this 
history shows that Congress envisioned “sexual abuse” as a crime of 
violence, ruling out such non-aggressive offenses.105 
Of course, this same reading of the legislative history preceding the 
passage of the IIRIRA could also be taken as evidence that Congress 
intended “sexual abuse of a minor” to encompass noncontact offenses. After 
all, if Congress truly intended “sexual abuse of a minor” to cover only 
crimes of violence, then why not include that key language? Also, why 
would Congress enumerate a separate provision for “sexual abuse of a 
minor” when “crimes of violence” already constitute grounds for 
deportation under § 101(a)(43)(F)? Under this view, “sexual abuse of a 
minor” must include something more than simply violent acts. As 
Guendelsberger claimed in his dissent from the Rodriguez-Rodriguez 
decision, “Congress was aware of the wide range of offenses constituting 
child abuse and child sexual abuse.”106 If true, then why would Congress 
choose not to limit the definition to a more precise meaning if they did not 
actually intend for “sexual abuse of a minor” to cover this wide range of 
offenses?107 Clearly, the legislative history behind IIRIRA does not give 
evidence of a congressional preference for any one definition. 
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III. IMPORTANT ISSUES SURROUNDING THE SEARCH FOR A 
DEFINITION 
As exemplified by the three-way circuit split and the murky legislative 
history behind the IIRIRA, there is neither agreement on what Congress 
intended by “sexual abuse of a minor” nor agreement on the best 
substantive definition for the term. Thus, the search for a preferred 
definition must look beyond pure congressional intent. In particular, 
concerns about uniformity, fairness, and the feminist goals of statutory rape 
laws may flesh out the definition best suited to § 101(a)(43)(A). 
A. Uniformity 
As a federal body of law, immigration law is intended to be uniformly 
applied across the nation. It is possible that the Constitution even mandates 
such uniformity through Article I, Section 8, Clause 4, which requires 
Congress “[t]o establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization.”108 Because 
deportation is the harshest penal measure that our immigration law 
provides, it is even more crucial that noncitizens in one state not be 
deported for actions that noncitizens just across a state border are able to 
commit without the same penalty. The difficulty, of course, arises when 
federal immigration law is dependent on a traditional arena of state 
sovereignty, such as standards of public morality.109 By depending on state 
standards of criminal conduct to define deportability, the government is 
allowing individual states to determine which noncitizens stay and which 
are expelled.110 However, to disregard these state standards of public 
morality may be seen as an encroachment on state sovereignty. 
To further complicate matters, immigration law is considered civil law, 
not criminal law. In the landmark decision Bugajewitz v. Adams, Justice 
Holmes held that, for constitutional purposes, deportation is not “a 
punishment; it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons 
whom it does not want.”111 However, “[i]t is doubtful that Holmes could 
have really meant that deportation is not punishment, if by ‘punishment’ 
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one means the imposition of harm or sanctions for misconduct or violation 
of the law.”112 It seems more likely that “Holmes was making a technical 
distinction in order to protect congressional exercise of the immigration 
power from the substantive and procedural limits the Constitution places on 
criminal proceedings.”113 In practice, this means that noncitizens do not 
enjoy the basic rights and procedural protections that they might in the 
criminal context. This includes the right to counsel, protection from double 
jeopardy, protection against cruel and unusual punishment, and limitations 
on ex post facto laws.114 Although deportation is an extremely severe 
mechanism,115 noncitizens who are charged with criminal acts are often not 
well represented or protected by the Constitution.116 Thus, it is critical to 
ensure that deportation is meted with a just and uniform hand. 
One article discussing the lack of uniformity in deportation matters points 
out that, currently, two forms of disunity exist in federal immigration law: 
First, sometimes the same conduct undertaken in different states 
will lead to conflicting decisions on deportation. By defeating 
normative uniformity in federal immigration law, this results in 
unfairness to immigrants and may violate the Constitution’s 
requirement of a uniform rule of naturalization. Second, federal 
deportations based on violations of state criminal laws may not 
reflect, and may directly undermine, the state policies embodied in 
those laws. Although the federal government defers to state 
legislatures on matters of criminal law, state legislatures do not 
necessarily consider immigration law consequences when passing 
legislation. This kind of nonuniformity is particularly troublesome 
because it could mean that deportation decisions are grounded in 
neither federal nor state policy.117 
In addition to these two disunities, another kind of disunity may enter the 
discourse on statutory rape laws. In the landmark case Michael M. v. 
Superior Court of Sonoma County, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it was 
permissible for state statutory rape laws to discriminate based on gender.118 
Although only one state currently discriminates based on gender,119 this 
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ruling opens up the possibility that a male would be deported for engaging 
in the same action of a female in the same state without risking deportation. 
Having deportability depend on the location of a noncitizen’s act will 
also lead to massively overinclusive or underinclusive immigration laws.120 
After all, if deportation aims to remove dangerous noncitizens, a law that 
allows for the deportation of only one individual when two individuals have 
committed the same act will either result in ridding the nation of only one 
dangerous offender—if the offense is, in fact, a danger to the public—or 
ridding the nation of one harmless person if the offense is not actually 
dangerous. Commentators have noted, “Either way, the current process does 
not provide a reliable method for determining which aliens should be 
deported because they are injurious to the public welfare.”121 
In order to unify immigration law with respect to sexual acts, the courts 
would have to interpret “sexual abuse of a minor” to include only those acts 
which are criminalized in every state. This “lowest common denominator” 
approach, while having the benefit of providing a predictable and uniform 
standard, probably does not accurately reflect the roughly established 
congressional intent to provide for expansive coverage of sexual abuse 
crimes.122 Unfortunately, since immigration law does depend on the state 
conviction for the initial qualification of noncitizens for deportation, it is 
unlikely that any definition short of the “lowest common denominator” 
would provide uniform application. However, while it may be undesirable 
to choose the one approach that provides total uniformity, courts should still 
strive to cut down on the extensive uneven application of immigration law 
that currently exists.123 
Disunity in immigration law may have serious consequences, resulting in 
unfairness to the noncitizen, the inadvertent undermining of state policy, 
deportations that do not reflect the intent of either federal or state 
policymakers, an unwittingly gendered immigration policy, overinclusive or 
underinclusive deportations, and constitutional violations. Although perhaps 
impracticable to seek total uniformity, when looking for the best substantive 
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definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” it is important to choose the 
definition that will allow for a more even-handed application of the law. 
B. Fairness 
Attempting to achieve justice and fairness is an important policy when 
drafting any law. As noted above, disunity in immigration law remains a 
source of unfairness for the noncitizens whose lives are affected. When 
deportation is determined by the state of residency, it results in inconsistent 
treatment of noncitizens and basic unfairness: one noncitizen is deported 
while another residing just across the state border is not deported, despite 
the fact that both are engaged in the same behavior. At the same time, this 
approach also leads to a distortion of federal and state policymakers’ intent. 
Federal policymakers enact immigration laws to achieve certain 
immigration results; unfortunately, the intended result can vary widely if the 
implementation of federal law depends on individual state laws. On the 
other hand, state policymakers might not consider the interaction of 
immigration and state law.124 This interaction can have unseen and 
undesired consequences. For example, a state legislature may choose to 
expand its use of suspended sentences in order to promote criminal 
rehabilitation outside of prisons. However, the state legislature may not 
explicitly factor into its reasoning the fact that noncitizens who receive 
suspended sentences, though serving no prison time, are still deportable. In 
such a case, the increased deportability of noncitizens who otherwise might 
not have received any sentence actually contradicts the state’s original 
policy goals.125 The end result is that a noncitizen may be removed when his 
or her deportation is desired by neither federal nor state policy. 
Immigration law’s reliance on state criminal statutes also results in 
noncitizens being disproportionately punished for their crimes. When 
convicted of a crime, a noncitizen faces the same sentence, the same fine, 
and the same prison time as a citizen. However, in addition to the criminal 
punishment, the noncitizen also suffers the additional penalty of 
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deportation, though neither the state legislature nor the state court may have 
factored that into their sentencing recommendations.126 
It is perhaps also important to note that the vast majority of noncitizens 
who are charged as aggravated felons are permanent residents, with an 
average length of residency of fifteen years in the United States.127 Twenty-
five percent of those charged saw twenty years pass between their arrival in 
the United States and their deportation proceedings.128 In a sense, these 
legal noncitizens lead their lives in an America with two sets of rules; 
noncitizens are expected to obey the same laws as citizens, but are also 
subject to an overlay of harsher penalties for their illegal actions. 
This extra burden placed on noncitizens seems potentially problematic in 
light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s determination that, because noncitizens 
are a discrete and insular minority without the ability to vote, laws affecting 
them should be subject to heightened scrutiny.129 Of course, these equal 
protection decisions were made in the context of state laws that denied 
noncitizens welfare benefits or employment options.130 However, the 
general principle that noncitizens are a vulnerable class of persons due to 
their lack of political power and insular nature holds true in any context and 
should make noncitizens particularly worthy of judicial and legislative 
protection. 
These protections are even more necessary today in light of the recent 
trends toward harsher immigration laws.131 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988,132 the Immigration Act of 1990,133 the Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994,134 the Immigration and Nationality 
Technical Corrections Act of 1994,135 the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996,136 the IIRIRA of 1996,137 and the REAL ID Act of 
2005138 have broadened the category of “aggravated felony,” have increased 
penalty for the reentry to aggravated felons, have heightened entry 
standards for asylum seekers, and have decreased procedural remedies 
available to noncitizens. Through these acts, Congress (1) sought to 
introduce summary deportation procedures and greatly narrowed judicial 
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discretion and review of deportation, exclusion, and removal; (2) prohibited 
aggravated felons from returning to the country; (3) increased the use of 
detainment; (4) applied the aggravated felony provision retroactively; and 
(5) “[took] great steps towards ‘dismissing all criminal aliens’ appeals as a 
matter of law.”139 
While Congress broadened the grounds for deportation, the executive 
departments that handle immigration matters have somewhat floundered in 
maintaining a consistent policy140 and appear to have adopted harsher 
punishments for noncitizens.141 It is possible that the executive branch’s 
contradictory policies “forced the INS, the BIA, and the Attorney General 
into using even more heavy-handed tactics with criminal aliens than 
perhaps Congress intended.”142 All in all, the current climate is one where 
criminal noncitizens face harsher penalties and do not enjoy widespread 
procedural remedies. Some legal commentators have decried these 
increasingly restrictive immigration laws as a product of anti-immigrant 
sentiment or xenophobia.143 However, whether one believes that the current 
immigration laws are unfair in and of themselves, it is important to 
recognize that criminal noncitizens operate in a sphere with few procedural 
protections. 
It is in this atmosphere of disproportionate punishments, increasingly 
harsh laws, and fewer procedural protections that the classic “rule of lenity” 
should be applied in favor of noncitizens. This rule, which states that 
ambiguities in the law should be interpreted in favor of defendants, was 
succinctly enunciated by Justice Douglas in an early opinion dealing with 
the potential deportation of a noncitizen convicted of murder: 
We resolve the doubts in favor of that construction because 
deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of 
banishment of exile. It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a 
residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty. To 
construe this statutory provision less generously to the alien might 
find support in logic. But since the stakes are considerable for the 
individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on 
Defining "Sexual Abuse of a Minor" in Immigration Law 879 
VOLUME 8 • ISSUE 2 • 2010 
his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of 
several possible meanings of the words used.144 
This principle of statutory construction perhaps sprung from the notion 
that courts should avoid constitutional questions when there are other 
grounds to resolve the case, thus resulting in the Supreme Court “frequently 
[stretching] language in favor of aliens when contrary interpretations would 
have raised troublesome constitutional issues.”145 
A long line of Supreme Court cases reaffirmed the principle that 
ambiguities be construed in favor of the noncitizen. In the 1964 case of 
Costello v. INS, the Court ruled that a provision in the INA allowing 
deportation of any noncitizen who was convicted of two crimes of moral 
turpitude “at any time after entry” did not apply to a noncitizen who was a 
citizen at the time of the offenses—even though that citizenship had been 
falsely acquired by willful misrepresentation.146 The Court justified its 
ruling by explaining that the Court was “constrained by accepted principles 
of statutory construction in this area of the law to resolve that doubt in favor 
of the petitioner.”147 Two years later, the Court interpreted a statute 
designed to save from deportation noncitizens who had gained entrance to 
the United States through misrepresentation; the Court held that “[e]ven if 
there were some doubt as to the correct construction of the statute, the doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the alien.”148 The rule of lenity has also 
emerged in landmark decisions relating to refugee law149 and, more 
recently, in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of provisions in the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the IIRIRA.150 The rule 
of lenity “has been described as the ‘most important rule of statutory 
interpretation peculiar to immigration.’”151 
Achieving uniform application, heightening scrutiny for an insular class 
without political power or many procedural protections, and interpreting 
statutes in favor of noncitizens all stand as important concerns of justice. 
When determining the scope of “sexual abuse of a minor” with an eye to 
fairness, we are pointed in the direction of a definition that construes this 
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term to the benefit of criminal noncitizens by encompassing a narrower 
class of offenses. 
C. The Feminist Goals of Statutory Rape Laws 
In contemplating the scope of “sexual abuse of a minor” it is appropriate 
to consider the goals that these statutory rape laws ideally hope to achieve, 
and to pick the definition that best encompasses these goals. In general, 
philosophers, feminists, and legal commentators agree that contemporary 
statutory rape laws are aimed at protecting the young—particularly young 
women—from predatory sexual behavior while preserving a youth’s sexual 
autonomy; the trick is finding the proper balance between these two 
goals.152 Historically, however, statutory rape laws developed to preserve a 
young woman’s chastity.153 For this reason, early statutory rape laws were 
often gender specific—protecting only minor females—and offered a 
“promiscuity” defense to the offender.154 Although only one state continues 
to have a gender-specific statutory rape statute on the books,155 the Supreme 
Court has ruled that gender-based discrimination is constitutional with 
regard to statutory rape laws.156 Because statutory rape springs from this 
gendered font, many of the theories justifying different statutory rape 
schemes are grounded in feminist thought. 
Due to the historical background of paternalism and the contemporary 
license for gender discrimination, some feminists harbor fears that statutory 
rape laws may still unfairly deny young females their sexual autonomy.157 
Other feminists, however, believe that increasingly more lenient statutory 
rape laws “serve primarily to grant men sexual access to minor females.”158 
This debate can be split down the lines of feminists who endorse formal 
equality versus feminists who endorse substantive equality.159 Those who 
advocate formal equality assert that the two genders should be treated alike, 
and “[fear] that the legal establishment will confuse [biological differences] 
with socially constructed differences and use them to justify discriminatory 
treatment.”160 This group particularly worries about the implications of 
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gendered statutory rape laws and focuses on the importance of a woman’s 
right to sexual freedom, implicitly endorsing less restrictive statutory rape 
laws.  
On the other hand, feminists advocating substantive equality recognize 
deeply entrenched gender inequalities that would distort facially neutral 
treatment into a perpetuation of such inequalities.161 These feminists support 
“different treatment of the sexes as long as such treatment [does] not 
perpetuate or exacerbate gender inequalities.”162 Feminists endorsing 
substantive equality exhibit a greater comfort with restrictive statutory rape 
laws, which are more protective of a young female’s right to security from 
sexual aggression.163  
Identifying the proper balance between these two concerns is crucial to 
achieving an acceptable statutory rape regime. Although carving out the 
scope of “sexual abuse of a minor” does not actually call upon courts to 
create a statutory rape regime from scratch, it does give courts the chance to 
balance these competing goals. Courts must define the line between 
preventing predatory behavior and protecting youths’ sexual autonomy. 
This is particularly true when the consequences of such a conviction could 
include deportation. 
One solution may be to look to a definition that includes an age-span 
provision that allows a window of permissible sexual activity between age-
appropriate peers. Such activity is arguably less harmful to the adolescent 
and achieves a proper balance between protection from predators and sexual 
autonomy.164 Another alternative is to permit older adolescents greater 
sexual autonomy while still providing strong protection for younger 
children through an age-graded regime. Although age does not necessarily 
indicate maturity in sexual decisionmaking, it may serve as a useful 
proxy.165 Of course, if the aim of statutory rape laws is to preserve a youth’s 
chastity, then allowing greater sexual autonomy for older adolescents would 
be nonsensical. However, because the goals of statutory rape laws have 
shifted toward protecting the youth’s freedom from sexual coercion, 
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allowing older adolescents more autonomy—and less protection—would 
seem appropriate. 
IV. SECTIONS 2242–2246 CONTAIN THE PROPER DEFINITION FOR 
“SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR” 
When construing the ambiguous congressional intent behind the term 
“sexual abuse of a minor,” courts must balance considerations of 
uniformity, fairness, and the feminist goals of statutory rape laws. First and 
foremost, it is crucial that courts tie “sexual abuse of a minor” to a federal 
definition to achieve uniform and fair application. Relying on state statutory 
rape convictions as a total proxy for aggravated felonies, as the First Circuit 
espouses, would lead to extensive and damaging disunity. Without a single 
definition, immigration law will fragment into a state-by-state determination 
of “who stays” and “who goes.” Considering that state legislatures do not 
usually take immigration consequences into account when passing 
legislation, this would produce immigration laws unbound by federal or 
state policy. 
Obviously, some disunity will still occur even if “sexual abuse of a 
minor” is tied to a federal definition since a noncitizen’s qualification for 
consideration of deportation depends initially on the state law that convicted 
the noncitizen. If the federal definition chosen is more expansive than a 
state’s statutory rape law, a noncitizen could go unpunished for an act that 
would cause him or her to be both convicted under another state’s law and 
deported under the INA. The only way to fully avoid disunity and still 
depend on state statutes of conviction is to define “sexual abuse of a minor” 
as encompassing only behavior which is criminalized by all states, leading 
to an undesirable lowest common denominator effect.166 Some disunity, 
while regrettable, is therefore inevitable as long as federal law defers to 
state standards of criminality and refuses to accept the lowest standards of 
criminal conduct. Fortunately, Congress arguably indicated that some 
disunity is acceptable via its statutory language.167 The crucial goal, 
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therefore, is simply to reduce disunity as much as possible with the adoption 
of a single unifying federal definition. 
Of course, using a federal definition still leaves courts with two viable 
options: § 3509(a) and §§ 2242–2246. Of these two definitions, §§ 2242–
2246 better comports with considerations of unity, fairness, and the feminist 
goals behind statutory rape laws. Sections 2242–2246 are also a narrower 
set of provisions, providing a lower age of sexual consent, an age-span 
provision of four years for minors between the ages of 12 and 16, and a 
requirement of sexual contact. Because they are narrower, §§ 2242–2246 
will decrease the range of offenses for which criminal noncitizens can be 
deported, resulting in a greater unity in the kinds of actions that result in 
deportation. Noncitizens who commit acts that are criminalized in states 
with broad statutory rape laws will receive similar treatment to those who 
commit offenses in states with less expansive laws. 
A narrow definition also better upholds the principle that ambiguities in 
immigration law should be construed in favor of the noncitizen.168 A narrow 
definition reduces the number of noncitizens who are disproportionately 
punished for their crimes. Some may argue that a rule ridding the nation of 
the greater number of noncitizens convicted of statutory rape is desirable 
due to the grave nature of the offense. Although statutory rape is a serious 
crime, “[i]f criminal punishment is to automatically follow the crime of 
statutory rape we should remember that immigrants face the possibility of 
overpaying by additionally losing their legal status in the United States. 
Because of this heightened penalty, perhaps their cases deserve cautious 
analysis.”169 Indeed, as suggested by the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
decisions, this “cautious analysis” may be particularly appropriate for 
noncitizens, a discrete and insular minority without the power to vote. 
Sections 2242–2246 include a lower age of consent and an age-span 
provision that seems to better match the goals of protecting youths’ security 
from sexual predators while simultaneously allowing them sexual 
autonomy. A survey of the states’ statutory rape statutes, a majority of 
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which set the age of sexual consent at sixteen, show that it is commonly 
accepted that older adolescents are mature enough to make sexual 
decisions.170 Statutory rape laws also trend toward incorporating age-span 
provisions, perhaps reflecting the belief that peer-on-peer sexual activity—
even when one peer is over eighteen—falls within the realm of youths’ 
permissible sexual decision-making.171 Even apart from feminist theory, the 
fact that a majority of states set the age of consent at sixteen and incorporate 
age-span provisions indicates that common perceptions over the proper 
scope of statutory rape laws comport more with the definition given in §§ 
2242–2246. 
Finally, defining “sexual abuse of a minor” through §§ 2242–2246 does 
not impede congressional intent. Both sides of the debate agree that in 
enacting IIRIRA, Congress was attempting to broaden the category of 
aggravated felonies, and both § 3509(a)(8) and §§ 2242–2246 do expand 
upon the previous categories. By not specifically cross-referencing “sexual 
abuse of a minor” with a noncriminal section of the federal code, it seems 
reasonable that Congress assumed the definition would be tied to federal 
substantive criminal law. Moreover, as suggested by Guendelsberger, by 
placing “sexual abuse of a minor” in the same provision as “murder” and 
“rape,” at the head of a long list of offenses—some of which incorporate 
other child-related sex crimes—Congress intended the term to cover the 
gravest of offenses, offenses that fall within the purview of §§ 2242–2246. 
In short, the narrower definition of §§ 2242–2246 will result in a greater 
unity of crimes for which criminal noncitizens are eligible to be deported 
and a reduction of criminal noncitizens who suffer a disproportionate 
punishment of deportation. Also, §§ 2242–2246 better achieve the feminist 
goal of securing youths’ sexual autonomy while not exposing youths to 
sexual predators, better reflecting contemporary notions of the scope of 
statutory rape laws, and more closely following the lines of congressional 
intent. 
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CONCLUSION 
Under the plain language of § 101(a)(42)(A), either § 3509(a), §§ 2242–
2246, or full reliance on a state statute of conviction appear to be 
permissible interpretations of “sexual abuse of a minor.” However, because 
immigration law is rooted in federal law, it would be impermissible to allow 
various definitions to attach to the same provision. The issue, therefore, is 
not which definition is permissible, but which definition is most 
appropriate. 
The First Circuit’s total dependence on a state’s statute of conviction 
would lead to an undesirable disunity of application of immigration law. 
The BIA’s chosen definition, § 3509(a)(8), provides an overly broad 
definition that does not comport with modern-day notions of the proper 
scope for statutory rape laws. This expansive definition would also heighten 
disunity by increasing the range of actions for which a noncitizen in one 
state could be deported, while a noncitizen in a second state with less 
restrictive laws would remain outside of the state penal law system and 
ineligible for removal. Because more noncitizens would be deportable 
under § 3509(a)(8), this broader definition may also heighten unfairness by 
having criminal noncitizens, already presumably punished by state courts, 
face a disproportionate penalty for their crimes. 
The narrower scope of §§ 2242–2246 better achieves the feminist goal of 
balancing the protection of youths’ security from sexual predators and the 
safeguarding of youths’ sexual autonomy. Sections 2242–2246 also align 
more closely with the majority of current state statutes, thus better 
complying with contemporary notions of statutory rape laws. These 
provisions construe the ambiguities in “sexual abuse of a minor” in favor of 
the noncitizen, an even more crucial principle to uphold in this era of 
harsher laws and fewer procedural protections for criminal noncitizens. 
Courts should thus follow the Ninth Circuit’s approach in tying “sexual 
abuse of a minor” to the definition found in §§ 2242–2246. 
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criminal statute outlining the elements of the offense, rather than the definition of ‘sexual 
abuse’ found in 18 U.S.C. § 3509.”). 
11 See James v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2008); Mercado v. Att’y Gen., 250 F. 
App’x 515 (3d Cir. 2007); Chuno v. Att’y Gen., 250 F. App’x 484 (3d Cir. 2007); Stubbs 
v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2006); Gattem v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 
2005); Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001); Bahar v. Ashcroft, 264 F.3d 1309 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
12 See United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000). 
13 See Silva v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Under the explicit language of 
the INA, all rape—including statutory rape—comes within the aggravated felony 
taxonomy.”). 
14 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) (2006). 
15 As a term of art in immigration law, “alien” is defined as a foreign-born person who is 
not a national or citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006). However, due 
to the negative overtones created by this term, such as implications of outsider status and 
lessened civil rights, this article will use the word “noncitizen” as a synonym to “alien” as 
it is used within immigration matters. See Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. 
Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 264 (1997).  
16 18 U.S.C. § 2244 (2006). 
17 The relevant section of § 2246 reads, 
(2) the term “sexual act” means— (A) contact between the penis and the vulva 
or the penis and the anus, and for purposes of this subparagraph contact 
involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however, slight; (B) contact 
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between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and 
the anus; (C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of 
another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, 
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or (D) the 
intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another 
person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, 
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; 
(3) the term “sexual contact” means the intentional touching, either directly or 
through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or 
buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or 
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. 
18 U.S.C. § 2246 (2006). 
18 Fong Haw Tan. v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). James Madison, a Founding Father, 
also recognized the deportation was an extremely harsh action: 
If the banishment of an alien from a country into which he has been invited as 
the asylum most auspicious to his happiness . . . if a banishment of this sort be 
not a punishment, and among the  severest of punishments, it will be 
difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied. 
JONATHAN ELLIOT, 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 555 (2nd ed., Philadelphia, Lippincott 1896). 
19 See Brent K. Newcomb, Immigration Law and the Criminal Alien: A Comparison of 
Policies for Arbitrary Deportations of Legal Permanent Residents Convicted of 
Aggravated Felonies, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 687, 698–701 (1998) (describing the recent 
legislation passed by Congress which restrict immigrants’ rights); see also William J. 
Johnson, Note, When Misdemeanors are Felonies: The Aggravated Felony of Sexual 
Abuse of a Minor, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 419, 423–25 (2007) (detailing the recent 
history of immigration reform). 
20 Note, however, that one court has discussed the difference in how the two provisions 
deal with indecent exposure offenses. See United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 
602 (5th Cir. 2000). Although the inclusion of indecent exposure as a deportable offense 
stands as an important difference between the two provisions, this difference has not 
generated the same amount of controversy as the difference in the statutory rape 
coverage. 
21 Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Towards a New Generation of Statutory Rape 
Laws, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 287, 311 (1997) (noting that the statutory rape laws were 
developed to protect young women’s chastity). 
22 In addition to the circuit split over what definition to use, circuits may also differ on 
whether to use the categorical or modified categorical approach when applying a certain 
definition. For suggestions on how courts should handle the categorical versus modified 
categorical question as it relates to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(f) “crimes of violence,” see 
Shani Fregia, Comment, Statutory Rape: A Crime of Violence for Purposes of 
Immigration Deportation?, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 539 (2007). Courts are also split as to 
whether state misdemeanor convictions for “sexual abuse of a minor” constitute an 
aggravated felony. For a fuller discussion of this circuit split, see Johnson, supra note 19. 
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23 In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991 (B.I.A 1999). 
24 See id. at 995–96 (finding the definition set forth in § 3509(a)(8) better captures the 
wide array of sexually abusive behavior against children). 
25 See James v. Mukasey, 522 F. 3d 250 (2d Cir. 2008); Mercado v. Att’y Gen., 250 F. 
App’x. 515 (3d Cir. 2007); Chuno v. Att’y Gen., 250 F. App’x 484 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Stubbs v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 251 (3rd Cir. 2006); Gattem v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 758 
(7th Cir. 2005); Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001); Bahar v. Ashcroft, 264 
F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2001). 
26 See United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000). 
27 See Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008). 
28 Silva v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2006). 
29 See In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 992.  
30 See id. 
31 See id. at 994. 
32 See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as 
amended in 9 U.S.C.); The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C.). 
33 In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 995. Even the Rodriguez-Rodriguez 
dissent, written by Board Member Guendelsberger, agreed that looking to a federal 
definition “achieves uniform results in situations where reliance upon fundamentally 
different state law definitions would lead to a patchwork immigration law.” Id. at 1000. 
34 Id. at 996. 
35 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1375 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the term sexual abuse as 
“[i]llegal sex acts performed against a minor by a parent, guardian, relative, or 
acquaintance”). 
36 In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 996. However, it is worth noting that 
the later Ninth Circuit opinion in Estrada-Espinoza questioned whether the § 3509(a)(8) 
definition was consonant with common understandings of “sexual abuse of a minor” as it 
raises the age of consent to eighteen. The Estrada-Espinoza court discussed the various 
ages of sexual consent among the states and concluded that “[t]he fact that the vast 
majority of states do not forbid consensual sexual intercourse with a seventeen-year-old 
male or female indicates that such conduct is not necessarily abusive under the ordinary, 
contemporary, and common meaning of ‘abuse.’” 546 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 
37 Board Member Filppu also wrote a dissent, arguing that “[t]he absence of a specific 
cross-reference to a federal statute . . . suggests that Congress may also have wanted us to 
take into account the various approaches the states have adopted in dealing with sexual 
crimes committed against minors.” Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 998. 
Uncomfortable with both the broadness of § 3509(a)(8) and the narrowness of §§ 2242–
2246, Filppu did not provide a firm definition for “sexual abuse of the minor” but 
remained “ill at ease providing a comprehensive answer in our first effort to grapple with 
the question.” Id. 
38 Id. at 1000 (Guendelsberger, dissenting) (“We are not here construing a law affording 
rights, but are determining the extent to which a conviction will be treated as an 
aggravated felony for purposes of immigration law. Such a classification renders an alien 
removable, eliminates nearly all forms of relief from removal, and perpetually bars 
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reentry. Given the grave consequences of such a determination, including separation from 
family and other ties to this country, the more appropriate reference point is the federal 
criminal law definition of ‘sexual abuse of a minor.’”). 
39 See id. at 1001 (Guendelsberger, dissenting) (“Both definitions expand the categories 
of aggravated felonies.”). 
40 Id. at 1004 (Guendelsberger, dissenting). 
41 Id. For a more in-depth discussion of this rule of lenity, see infra Part III.B. 
42 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) 
(“If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as 
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court 
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”). 
43 See Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52, 55 (2nd Cir. 2001) (noting that Chevron 
required the court to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of § 101(a)(43)(A)). 
44 Id. at 55 (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)). 
45 Id. 
46 See James v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 250, 254 (2d Cir. 2008) (deferring to the BIA’s 
interpretation of § 101(a)(43)(A) in determining whether the petitioner’s New York 
conviction for rape in the third degree constituted “sexual abuse of a minor”); Mercado v. 
Att’y Gen., 250 F. App’x 515, 518 (3d Cir. 2007) (looking to the BIA definition of 
“sexual abuse of a minor” to determine whether the New Jersey statute of conviction 
qualified); Chuno v. Att’y Gen., 250 F. App’x 484, 486 (3d Cir. 2007) (deferring to the 
BIA’s § 3509(a)(8) definition of “sexual abuse of a minor”); Stubbs v. Att’y Gen., 452 
F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the petitioner’s conviction fails to fit the BIA’s 
definition of “sexual abuse of a minor”); Gattem v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 758, 763 (7th Cir. 
2005) (“[I]nsofar as the Board’s holding as to Gattem turns on an interpretation of the 
INA, we must defer to that construction. . . .”); Mugalli, 258 F.3d at 55 (“[W]e defer to 
the BIA’s interpretation of § 1101(a)(43)(A) in determining the meaning of ‘sexual 
abuse of a minor.’”); Bahar v. Ashcroft, 264 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[w]e will 
defer to the Board’s interpretation if it is reasonable.”). 
47 The Eleventh Circuit has not specifically adopted the § 3509(a)(8) definition. 
However, in the short Bahar v. Ashcroft opinion, the Eleventh Circuit favored an 
expansive meaning of “sexual abuse of a minor” that did not require physical contact and 
agreed to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of § 101(a)(43)(A). 264 F.3d at 1311–12. 
48 See Stubbs, 452 F.3d at 265 (“Even if we assume, without deciding, that the BIA’s 
interpretation is permissible, [the defendant alien’s] offense still does not qualify.”). 
49 Mugalli, 258 F.3d at 58–59. 
50 See id. at 59 (noting that the BIA’s nationwide definition is consistent with the general 
rule that federal laws not be construed to have their meaning depend on state law). 
51 Id. at 60. 
52 Id. (citing INA §101(a)(43)).  
53 Gattem v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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54 See Lara-Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934, 941–42 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing why 
congressional intent behind “sexual abuse of a minor” did not support such a narrow 
reading). 
55 See id. at 942 (“Lara-Ruiz offers no good reason why we must refer to § 2243 rather 
than to § 3509.”). 
56 See Espinoza-Franco v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 461, 464–65 (noting that “Congress 
intended the phrase ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ to broadly incorporate all acts” as a 
justification for rejecting the petitioner’s argument that sexual abuse be defined by §§ 
2241–48 instead of § 3509); Gattem, 412 F.3d at 764–65 (observing that prior case law 
“put to rest our dissenting colleague’s contention that the Board has gone astray in 
choosing section 3509(a) as a reference point in assessing the nature of an alien’s 
conviction.”). 
57 See United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 602 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
“sexual indecency with a child by exposure constitutes ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ for 
purposes of the aggravated felony sentencing enhancement on Sentencing Guidelines § 
2L1.2). 
58 Id. at 602. 
59 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (2009). 
60 See Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d at 602 (describing the defendant noncitizen’s offense). 
61 Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d at 604. “Sexual” is defined as “[o]f, pertaining to, affecting, 
or characteristic of sex, the sexes or the sex organs and their functions.” THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1124 (2d ed. 1982). “Abuse” is defined as “[t]o use wrongly or 
improperly” or “[t]o hurt or injure by maltreatment.” Id. at 70.  
62 Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d at 605. 
63 See id. at 606–07 (“Specifically, Congress did not define ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ by 
expressly referencing other provisions of the United States Code, as it did in several other 
parts of § 1101(a)(43)(A). . . . Nor did Congress narrow the definition of ‘sexual abuse of 
a minor’ by requiring a minimum sentence length, thereby ensuring the offense was of a 
sufficient severity.”). 
64 Id. at 607 n.8. 
65 See id. (“This definition would seemingly cover an offense under Texas Penal Code § 
21.11(a)(2). . . .”). 
66 Id. at 608. 
67 See Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2008). For the facts 
of Estrada-Espinoza, see supra Introduction. 
68 Afridi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1212, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 2006). 
69 Id. at 1216 (“The BIA’s definition was based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”). 
70 See Estrada-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 933, 936 (2007) (“Afridi is binding 
precedent and controls this case. . . . Therefore the BIA and IJ did not err in denying 
relief and we must deny the petition for review.”). 
71 See id. at 1152 n.2 (“[I]t is more plausible that Congress intended the ‘aggravated 
felony’ of ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ to incorporate the definition of ‘sexual abuse of a 
minor’ in 18 U.S.C. § 2243, which is a criminal statute outlining the elements of the 
offense, rather than the definition of ‘sexual abuse’ found in 18 U.S.C. § 3509.”). 
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72 Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1160 n.15 (“In so holding, we necessarily overrule 
Afridi v. Gonzales.”). 
73 Id. at 1155. For example, INA § 101(a)(43)(B), “illicit trafficking in a controlled 
substance,” and INA § 101(a)(43)(F) “crime of violence” are cross-referenced with other 
federal provisions. Id. 
74 Id. For example, INA § 101(a)(43)(A) “murder, rape,” INA § 101(a)(43)(G) “a theft 
offense . . . or burglary offense” are not cross-referenced. Id. at 1156. 
75 See id. at 1156. 
76 Id. But see United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 607 n.8 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(arguing that as federal substantive law and the INA serve very different purposes 
Congress may have had good reasons for adopting different definitions). 
77 Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1156. 
78 Id. at 1157. 
79 See id. (“The Supreme Court has instructed that ‘[i]nterpretations such as those in 
opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and 
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style 
deference.”) (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). 
80 Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1157. 
81 Id. (citing Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotations 
removed). 
82 Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1153 (“[U]nder national contemporary standards, 
although sexual activity with a younger child is certainly abusive, sexual activity with an 
older adolescent is not necessarily abusive.”). 
83 See id. (analyzing trends in state statutory rape laws). 
84 See id. at 1153–54 (“[O]ur prior case law—as well as common sense—suggest that, 
while consensual underage sex may be psychologically harmful to a young teen, it may 
not be harmful to an older one.”) (citing United States v. Lopez Solis, 447 F.3d 1201, 
1208 (9th Cir. 2006). See also United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1101 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (pointing out that under California statutory rape laws a person can “annoy” or 
“molest” a minor without injuring him or her); United States v. Melton, 344 F.3d 1021, 
1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “some courts have hesitated in categorically equating 
the physical risks of sexual acts to minors of different age groups.”); United States v. 
Thomas, 159 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is difficult to maintain on a priori 
grounds that sex is physically dangerous to 16 year old girls.”); United States v. Kirk, 111 
F.3d 390, 396 n.8 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding that a serious potential for physical injury 
does not necessarily exists with sexual contact between a nineteen-year-old and a sixteen-
year-old). 
85 See Emile v. INS, 244 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 2001); Silva v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 26 (1st 
Cir. 2006). 
86 See Emile, 244 F.3d at 185 (describing the facts of the offense). 
87 Id. at 188. 
88 See id. at 165 n.2 (“Elsewhere in the federal criminal code, see 18 U.S.C. § 
3509(a)(8)(1994), the term “sexual abuse” is used broadly enough that it indubitably 
covers [the petitioner’s] conduct, but it is debatable how relevant this provision may 
be.”). 
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89 See id. at 165 n.1 (“We do not want to be understood as endorsing the view that every 
possible violation of the federal sexual abuse chapter would automatically translate into a 
deportable offense.”). 
90 See Silva, 455 F.3d at 27 (describing the facts and procedural history of the case). The 
immigration judge presiding over the removal proceedings determined that the 
noncitizen’s state conviction was for both the crime of rape and the crime of abuse of a 
child, so that the noncitizen qualified doubly as an aggravated felon. See id. On appeal, 
the noncitizen argued that statutory rape did not constitute “sexual abuse of a minor” but 
he did not specifically challenge the immigration judge’s determination that he had also 
been convicted of the crime of rape. See id. at 28. Although the First Circuit thus 
concluded that “[b]y not setting out any developed argumentation to contradict the 
immigration judge’s classification of his conviction as rape, the petitioner has waived any 
challenge to that determination,” the court still proceeded to answer this imputed claim, 
as if it had been preserved. Id. at 29. 
91 Id. 
92 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24–4(a) (West 2001). 
93 See In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 994 (B.I.A 1999) (“The terms 
rape and sexual abuse of a minor were added in an expansion of the definition of what 
constitutes an aggravated felony and an overall increase in the severity of the 
consequences for aliens convicted of crimes.”). 
94 See Johnson, supra note 19, at 428–33 (providing an in depth analysis of IIRIRA). 
95 See IIRIRA § 301(b) (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9). 
96 See INA § 101(a)(48)(A) (1998), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (2000) (“The term 
‘conviction’ means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien 
entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where—(i) a judge or 
jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere 
or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered 
some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.”). 
This definition of “conviction” prevents judges from deferring adjudication in favor of 
some form of probation so that the conviction would not be entered on the record, making 
the alien eligible for deportation. See also Johnson, supra note 19, at 428-29 (explaining 
how IIRIRA eliminated judicial discretion). 
97 See The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 § 305 (1996) (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C.), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231 (2006). 
98 See IIRIRA § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2000). 
99 See IIRIRA § 304(a), 8 U.S.C. §1228 (2000). 
100 See IIRIRA § 306(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. §1252 (2006). 
101 See IIRIRA § 321(b), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43) (2006). 
102 See In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 1002 (B.I.A. 1999) 
(Guendelsberger, dissenting) (“The decision by Congress to place ‘sexual abuse of a 
minor’ in section 101(a)(43)(A), alongside murder and rape, suggests that it was focusing 
on the most egregious offenses.”). But see United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 
606 n.7 (5th Cir. 2000) (“This argument would find no support in the rest of the statute, 
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which includes numerous offenses within the definition of an “aggravated felony” which, 
while serious, are less severe than murder or rape.”). 
103 See In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1002 (concluding that the scope 
“sexual abuse of a minor” should be considered “in light of the overage of the other 
aggravated felony categories.”). 
104 IIRIRA proposed section H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. § 218 (1996). 
105 See In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1003 (“Notably, proposed section 
241(a)(2)(F) categorized ‘sexual abuse’ as an offense involving violence or the threat of 
violence.”); see also Emile v. INS, 244 F.3d 183, 186–87 (1st Cir. 2001) (observing that 
the legislative history of IIRIRA in the House makes it likely that Congress intended 
“sexual abuse of a minor” to encompass conduct that would be criminal under §§ 2241, 
2242, and 2244). Guendelsberger further argued that “[i]n choosing its terms, Congress 
also was aware that the federal criminal law and a number of state laws employing the 
‘sexual abuse of a minor’ definition limit the range of offenses covered to those involving 
sexual acts or sexual contact, and do not include within their scope indecent exposure.” In 
re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1003. However, the legislative history does 
not indicate that Congress specifically considered either the definitions given by federal 
or state law, or the Model Penal Code, which classifies indecent exposure as a 
misdemeanor. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.5 (“A person commits a misdemeanor if, 
for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of himself or of any person other 
than his spouse, he exposes his genitals under circumstances in which he knows his 
conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm.”). 
106 In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1003. 
107 See Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d at 606–07 (arguing that in not “expressly limiting the 
meaning of ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ in ways it employed in other parts of § 
1101(a)(42)(A),” Congress did, in fact, intend a broad definition). 
108 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Although naturalization and immigration are not 
synonymous, one can argue that immigration falls under the congressional power to set 
up a uniform rule of naturalization. “However, it is not clear from the Constitution what 
is meant by ‘uniform’ and whether such a standard applies to the application of 
naturalization rules.” Christina LaBrie, Lack of Uniformity in the Deportation of Criminal 
Aliens, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357, 363–64 (1999). 
109 See LaBrie, supra note 108, at 365 (“Congress traditionally defers to state standards of 
public morality.”). 
110 See id. (“[B]y using state standards to define criminal conduct for the purposes of 
immigration and naturalization laws, the federal government in effect allows itself to 
deny citizenship to (or deport) an immigrant for an act that is a crime in one state but not 
another.”). See also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 567–68 (5th ed. 2003) (describing the problems with 
uniformity and the aggravated felony provision). 
111 228 U.S. 585, 592 (1913). 
112 ALEINIKOFF, supra note 110, at 538. 
113 Id. 
114 See LaBrie, supra note 108 at 361 (noting that because deportation is a civil penalty 
noncitizens are denied basic constitutional rights). 
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115 See discussion, supra note 18. 
116 See, e.g., Kevin Costello, Without a Country: Indefinite Detention as Constitutional 
Purgatory, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 503, 508–09 (noting that the majority of courts have 
found that excludable noncitizens are not protected by the Fifth Amendment); Tracey 
Topper Gonzalez, Individual Rights Versus Collective Security, 11 U. MIAMI INT’L 
COMP. L. REV. 75, 86–87 (discussing that constitutional protections of the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments afforded to noncitizens are not as complete as those 
afforded to American citizens); LaBrie, supra note 108 at 362–63 (“Criminals who are 
citizens can rely on the Constitution to provide them with procedural fairness, but 
criminal aliens cannot.”). 
117 Id. at 363. For examples of how the unintended consequences of the interaction 
between state and immigration law can undermine state policies, see supra Part III.B. 
118 450 U.S. 464, 464 (1981) (holding that a California statutory rape statute which only 
criminalized having sexual relations with minor females did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
119 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18–6101 (2009). 
120 See LaBrie, supra note 108, at 367 (discussing the dangers in having the location of 
the offense determine deportability). 
121 Id. 
122 For a fuller discussion on the “lowest common denominator” effect, see supra Part 
I.B. 
123 See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 110, at 568 (“Assuming that uniformity ought to be a 
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